

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00313 01 OF 02 161217Z  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
-----161241Z 091232 /41  
P 161137Z JUN 77  
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2205

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0313

EXDIS

NOFORN

DEPT PASS DEFENSE

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PARM NATO  
SUBJECT: MBFR: US-SOVIET BILATERAL OF JUNE 13, 1977

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: US DEP REP MET WITH SOVIET DEP REP SHUSTOV JUNE 13 AT SHUSTOV'S INVITATION. DURING THE DISCUSSION, SHUSTOV TOUCHED ON MOST ASPECTS OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. HE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN CONTINUING DISCUSSION OF REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND OF PHASE I COMMITMENTS BY NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND HIS REMARKS APPEARED TO INDICATE THERE WAS SOME ROOM FOR DEVELOPMENT IN SOVIET POSITION ON THESE TWO ISSUES. DISCUSSION OF REMAINING TOPICS DID NOT REVEAL ANYTHING FUNDAMENTALLY NEW. END SUMMARY.

2. SHUSTOV BEGAN BY SUGGESTING THAT THE WEST ASK A QUESTION ABOUT ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN JUNE 14 INFORMAL. HE SAID THIS WOULD TRIGGER AN EASTERN RESPONSE IN THE FOLLOWING INFORMAL SESSION. HOWEVER, THIS RESPONSE WOULD NOT BE VERY MUCH TO THE WEST'S LIKING. IT WOULD BE LARGELY PROCEDURAL. THE RESPONSE WOULD NOT DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF

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VERIFICATION. SHUSTOV SAID THE SOVIETS HAD REACHED NO POSITION ON VERIFICATION AS YET BECAUSE THEY THOUGHT THIS QUESTION SHOULD BE TURNED TO AFTER MAIN ISSUES OF PRINCIPLE HAD BEEN RESOLVED. HOWEVER, SHUSTOV SAID HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE QUOTE BY COMBINING NATIONAL MEANS AND OTHER METHODS OF VERIFICATION UNQUOTE TO FORMULATE WORKABLE PROPOSALS ON THIS TOPIC.

3. SHUSTOV ASKED WHY NETHERLANDS REP IN JUNE 7 INFORMAL SESSION HAD PLACED SUCH EMPHASIS ON ARMAMENT INCREASES IN THE WARSAW PACT FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA. US DEPREP SAID THIS HAD BEEN IN RESPONSE TO CRITICISMS BY EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES OF DECISIONS TAKEN AT RECENT NATO MEETINGS IN LONDON. SHUSTOV SAID EAST WOULD BE RESPONDING TO THIS PRESENTATION BY NETHERLANDS REP, BUT HE HOPED THAT THE SUBJECT OF ARMAMENT INCREASES OF BOTH SIDES WOULD NOT BECOME A CENTRAL TOPIC OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. US DEPREP AGREED. HE CONSIDERED THAT THE ISSUES INVOLVED WENT BEYOND THOSE THAT COULD BE HANDLED IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS.

4. US DEP REP COMMENTED THAT PRAVDA HAD RECENTLY PUBLISHED THE EASTERN MANPOWER FIGURES EARLIER TABLED IN VIENNA. SHUSTOV SAID THIS HAD NOT BEEN DONE IN ORDER TO LAY THE BASIS FOR PROPAGANDA DEVELOPMENT OF THE DATA TOPIC, BUT RATHER TO INFORM EASTERN PUBLICS ON THE SUBJECT. THE LATTER WERE GETTING ALL THEIR INFORMATION, ESPECIALLY ALL THEIR NUMBERS, FROM WESTERN BROADCASTS. SHUSTOV ASKED WHEN THE WEST WOULD PRESENT A DEFINITIVE ANSWER TO THE EASTERN PROPOSAL TO TABLE NATIONAL TOTALS. US DEP REP SAID THE WEST WAS WORKING ON A REPLY. SHUSTOV SAID HE HAD HEARD INFORMALLY THAT THE WEST WAS CONSIDERING DATA COVERING COMBAT SUPPORT AND SERVICE SUPPORT. US DEP REP SAID WEST HAD VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES IN MIND.

5. SHUSTOV COMPLAINED THAT THE DATA DISCUSSION WAS TAKING A LONG TIME. US DEP REP POINTED OUT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER IF THE SOVIETS HAD TABLED DATA EARLIER, IF DESPITE THEIR OWN ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE THAT FRANCE WOULD NOT BE HAPPY WITH TABLING FIGURES ON ITS FORCES, THE SOVIETS HAD NOT THEN POSED THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE  
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WEST UPDATE ITS DATA BEFORE THE SOVIETS WOULD DISCUSS THE BASIS ON WHICH EASTERN FIGURES HAD BEEN COMPILED, AND IF THE SOVIETS HAD ACCEPTED THE WESTERN SUGGESTION TO BEGIN DISCUSSION OF DETAIL WITH US AND SOVIET FIGURES. SINCE THE SOVIETS HAD IN FACT TAKEN THESE POSITIONS, THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DRAWING OUT THE DATA DISCUSSION WAS LARGELY THEIRS.

6. US DEP REP SAID THAT, IN ANY EVENT, REPEATED REVIEWS OF WESTERN DATA HAD CONFIRMED THE EXISTENCE OF A SUBSTANTIAL EASTERN SUPERIORITY  
, AND THIS MATTER WOULD HAVE TO BE RESOLVED BEFORE THERE COULD BE AN AGREEMENT. SHUSTOV SAID THE SOVIETS REALIZED THIS LATTER POINT NOW. SHUSTOV DID NOT REPLY TO US DEP REP'S STATEMENTS THAT THERE WAS AN EASTERN SUPERIORITY IN MILITARY MANPOWER EXCEPT TO SAY THAT THERE MUST BE SOME DIFFERENCE IN THE WAY EACH SIDE HAD COUNTED EASTERN MANPOWER. US DEP REP SAID THERE WAS A WAY, OF COURSE, OF BRINGING THE DATA DISCUSSION TO A MORE RAPID CLOSE. INSTEAD OF PLAYING A PASSIVE ROLE AND OBLIGING THE WEST TO CARRY OUT AN EXTENDED PROGRAM OF EXAMINING EASTERN DATA IN DETAIL IN ORDER TO

LOCATE THE SOURCE OF THE DISCREPANCY, EASTERN REPS COULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO INDICATE WHERE THEY THOUGHT IT WAS AND HOW LARGE IT WAS. THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD NOT DONE SO DESPITE SHUSTOV'S RECOGNITION THAT THE DATA ISSUE MUST BE SOLVED INDICATED TO THE US DEP REP THAT THEY WERE NOT YET READY TO MOVE SERIOUSLY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. SHUSTOV SAID HE WOULD NOT COMMENT ON THIS STATEMENT, BUT THAT HE WAS STRONGLY OF THE VIEW THAT, IF THE MANPOWER DATA ISSUE WERE RESOLVED, OTHER NEGOTIATING PROBLEMS WOULD FALL INTO PLACE.

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
-----161248Z 091418 /40  
P 161137Z JUN 77  
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2206

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0313

EXDIS

NOFORN

DEPT PASS DEFENSE

FROM US REP MBFR

7. US DEP REP SAID, IF THE SOVIETS WANTED TO SHOW SOME PROGRESS IN THE VIENNA TALKS AND WERE CONCERNED THAT IT WOULD TAKE A LONG TIME TO RESOLVE THE DATA ISSUE, WHAT ABOUT AGREEMENT ON SOME STABILIZING MEASURES IN THE INTERIM. THIS APPROACH WOULD NOT ENTAIL THE COMPLICATIONS OF A FREEZE BECAUSE IT WOULD NOT CONTRACTUALIZE A DISPARITY. SHUSTOV SAID STABILIZING MEASURES MIGHT BE USEFUL IN A NEGOTIATION DEVOTED TO REDUCING THE RISK OF SURPRISE ATTACK, BUT THE VIENNA TALKS WERE SUPPOSED TO BE ABOUT FORCE REDUCTIONS.

8. THE US DEP REP POINTED OUT THAT IN GENERAL THE SOVIETS HAD FAILED TO REALIZE THE DEPTH OF CONCERN ON THE PART OF THE WESTERN EUROPEANS ABOUT THE VAST DIFFERENCE IN MILITARY STRENGTH BETWEEN THEMSELVES AND THE SOVIET UNION. IN ADDITION, THE FRG UNDERSTANDABLY HAD HISTORICAL SENSITIVITY TO EFFORTS BY OUTSIDE POWERS TO APPLY CONTROLS ON GERMAN ARMED FORCES. THE SOVIETS HAD FAILED TO DISPEL THESE APPREHENSIONS, ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD HAVE TO DO SO IF

THERE WAS TO BE AN AGREEMENT. IN FACT, THE EASTERN REDUCTION APPROACH, LARGELY THE WORK OF THE SOVIETS, HAD INTENSIFIED THESE CONCERNS. IT WAS NOT UP TO THE US TO SUPPLY A POSITIVE INTERPRETATION.  
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TION OF THE SOVIET PROGRAM OR TO DISPEL SUCH WESTERN EUROPEAN APPREHENSIONS. ONLY THE SOVIETS COULD DO THIS AND THIS HAD TO COME THROUGH ACTIONS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS RATHER THAN BY GENERAL STATEMENTS.

9. SHUSTOV SAID HE HAD HEARD THIS POINT BEFORE FROM US REPS AND HE REALIZED THAT ONLY THE SOVIETS COULD ACT AND NOT THE US FOR THEM. HE ASKED HOW THE SOVIETS MIGHT DO THIS IN PRACTICE. US DEP REP SAID THAT FOR THE SOVIETS TO ACCEPT THE COLLECTIVITY PRINCIPLE WOULD BE A USEFUL SIGNAL. APPARENTLY, THE SOVIET POSITION WAS THAT, IF THERE WAS TO BE COLLECTIVITY, IT SHOULD BE FOR EVERYONE. THERE WERE SERIOUS REASONS WHY THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A SUBCEILING ON THE SOVIETS. WESTERN REPS HAD BEEN TRYING TO MAKE THIS CLEAR IN RECENT INFORMAL SESSIONS. SHUSTOV SAID THAT IT WAS NOT THE OFFICIAL SOVIET POSITION THAT THERE SHOULD BE COLLECTIVITY FOR EVERYONE. US DEP REP SAID THAT, WHETHER OR NOT THIS WAS THE CASE, MOVEMENT IN THIS DIRECTION WOULD HAVE A GOOD EFFECT.

10. US DEP REP SAID THAT, SECOND, AN EASTERN EXPLANATION THAT THE EAST

WOULD ACCEPT A STAGE ONE COMMITMENT FROM NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AS REGARDS THEIR STAGE TWO REDUCTIONS IN TERMS OF A COMMITMENT TO REDUCE A GLOBAL NUMBER OF THEIR MANPOWER, DROPPING ARMAMENTS FROM THIS PLEDGE, WOULD BE USEFUL. SHUSTOV SAID THAT EAST REPRESENTATIVE HAD EXPLAINED SEVERAL TIMES THAT THEY ONLY WANTED A NUMBER AND TIMING IN THIS COMMITMENT. EASTERN REPS HAD ALSO SAID THAT THEY WANTED REDUCTION BY UNITS AND HAD MADE OTHER POINTS. BUT THESE POINTS WERE THE WAY THE EAST THOUGHT REDUCTION SHOULD BE. THEY WERE NOT REQUIREMENTS FOR A STAGE ONE REDUCTION COMMITMENT BY NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS FOR THEIR STAGE TWO REDUCTIONS. THE EAST WANTED ONLY NUMBER AND AMOUNT. US DEP REP SAID SOVIETS HAD NOT MAKE THIS POINT CLEAR OFFICIALLY. THE EAST HAD NOT EXPLAINED WHAT IT UNDERSTOOD UNDER THE TERM "SCOPE" OR "NUMBER" AND WHETHER IT INCLUDED ARMAMENTS. APPARENTLY THIS AMBIGUITY WAS DELIBERATE BECAUSE EAST WANTED WEST TO TAKE THE FIRST STEP BY MAKING A COUNTER OFFER. BUT THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION CALLED FOR AN EASTERN INITIATION.  
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ATIVE ON THIS ISSUE. SHUSTOV SAID HE WOULD THINK MORE ABOUT THIS SUBJECT AND WOULD COME BACK TO IT.

11. SHUSTOV SAID THE SOVIETS CONTINUED TO BE INTERESTED IN PURSU-  
ING THE DISCUSSION OF ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS. AS HE UNDERSTOOD THE  
US VIEW, THERE SHOULD BE NO COMMITMENTS IN A FIRST AGREEMENT BY  
THE WESTERN EUROPEANS TO REDUCE ARMAMENTS IN PHASE ONE AND THE ISSUE  
OF ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS BY THE WESTERN EUROPEANS SHOULD BE LEFT  
COMPLETELY OPEN FOR POSSIBLE DISCUSSION IN PHASE TWO. BUT THERE WAS  
THE PROBLEM OF REDUCTION OF THE ARMAMENTS OF THE TANK ARMY OTHER  
THAN THE TANKS. ALSO, THE WEST ONLY WANTED TO REDUCE TWO DIFFERENT  
TYPES OF ARMAMENTS. IT WOULD MAKE A BETTER IMPRESSION IF BOTH  
SIDES REDUCED THE SAME KIND OF ARMAMENT AND IF A THIRD TYPE, SUCH AS  
SURFACE TO AIR MISSILES, WERE ADDED. US DEP REP SAID HE WAS AWARE  
THAT THE SOVIETS HAD A PROBLEM WITH THE ARMAAMENTS OF A SOVIET  
TANK ARMY. HE FORESAW A MAJOR PROBLEM IN THE SOVIET VIEW THAT BOTH  
SIDES SHOULD REDUCE THE SAME ARMAMENT BECAUSE THIS WOULD RESULT  
IN LIMITATIONS ON BOTH SIDES AND COULD RAISE THE ISSUE OF CONTRACT-  
UALIZATION OF EXISTING NUMERICAL SUPERIORITIES. SHUSTOV INDICATED  
THE SOVIETS WOULD GIVE THE ARMAMENTS ISSUE FURTHER THOUGHT AND  
WOULD RETURN TO IT AT A LATER TIME. RESOR

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## Message Attributes

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